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ABSTRACT  
   
Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat 
to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm 
lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit 
firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. 
Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower 
probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is 
in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, 
clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in 
industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with 
greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical literature from political science depicts lobbying as a process of 
well-informed, interested parties transmitting information to relatively uninformed 
members of government (Potters and van Winden 1992). However, many of these 
presumably uninformed targets of lobbying become lobbyists themselves in the 
common practice of revolving door hiring, leading to the popular belief supported by 
reports by insiders that lobbying is primarily about contacts and access (McGrath 
2006).  From the information transfer perspective, all large audit firms are able to offer 
area expertise for tax issues and financial reporting across a number of industries. 
However, under the contacts and access model, frequent lobbying of the same 
individuals allows familiarity to develop, leading to better access. For this reason, I 
propose that greater intensity of lobbying (total lobbying activity reported in dollars) by 
an audit firm makes that firm more attractive to potential clients that find lobbying 
relevant. Accordingly, I find that potential clients in industries with the greatest interest 
in lobbying gravitate to audit firms that engage in more lobbying activity. 
While prior work in auditor switching has focused on vertical switching 
to/from a lower tier audit firm from/to a higher tier audit firm (Shu 2000; Landsman et 
al. 2009, etc.), the vast majority of client firms in the population utilized by archival 
audit researchers receive their audit from a Big N auditor. My study addresses this 
deficiency in the literature by providing some insight on lateral auditor switching 
within the Big N tier.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides 
background information about the history of auditor political activity and federal 
lobbying in general. Chapter 3 presents the development of my hypothesis. Chapter 4 
presents the research design to test my hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes how the sample 
was constructed and presents descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 discusses the results of the 
hypothesis tests, and Chapter 7 concludes the paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND  
Lobbying Background 
From its inception as a regulated practice, the accounting profession has 
developed and maintained a relationship with government through various means. The 
Big N audit firms have had a long and significant presence among those lobbying the 
federal government, consistently placing within the top ten percent of organizations in 
terms of lobbying activity going back to the first year that data is available1. Although 
1998 is the first year for which lobbying data is readily and publicly available (an 
outcome of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995), lobbying as an activity has occurred 
virtually since the existence of a federal government to lobby.2  
While petitioning government is protected by the Constitution as free speech, 
abuses, scandals, and general public mistrust caused the government to put in place the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act to clarify who needed to register as a lobbyist, what needed to 
be reported, and how frequently it had to be reported. At the same time, the act made 
provisions for investigating and penalizing non-compliance. Lobbying activity reported 
under the Act includes contact made with members of Congress, officials in the 
Executive Branch (including those in bureaus falling under the Executive Branch such as 
officials in the Internal Revenue Service), and influential members of independent 
                                                 
1 The Big N (the current Big 4 plus Andersen) are the only audit firms that appear as registered lobbyists in 
the federal disclosure forms as made available by the Center for Responsive Politics. A few other audit 
firms appear in the lobbying data as clients of other outside lobbyists. 
 
2 Per the Center for Responsive Politics website, the first known lobbyist in the United States was hired in 
1792 by the Virginia veterans of the Continental Army to lobby Congress for additional compensation.   
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agencies such as the SEC. According to the Act, any individual with more than one 
contact with a covered government official and who is compensated to spend 20 percent 
or more of their time lobbying or in support of their lobbying during any three month 
period must register as a lobbyist. Lobbying firms that employ such lobbyists are required 
to file a separate registration for each client in which they detail lobbying income 
received from the client, which individual lobbyists were used for that client, what issues 
were lobbied for, and which house of Congress or federal agency was lobbied. In addition 
to “hired gun” lobbyists, the registration requirements also apply to individuals employed 
in-house by the entity seeking to lobby the federal government. In these cases, the entity 
with lobbying interests self-files, and the dollar amounts reported represent lobbying 
expenditures as opposed to lobbying income.  
However, reported lobbying activity represents just the tip of the iceberg. 
Amounts under reporting thresholds are not required to be reported, which are currently 
$3,000 in income per client for lobbying firms and $12,500 in expenditure for self-
lobbying (internal) entities. Meanwhile, efforts by the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007  to create a longer “cooling off” period between leaving office 
and engaging in lobbying for lawmakers and high-level staff members seem to have only 
further obscured the true amount and nature of lobbying activity. Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that one consequence of the longer “cooling off” period has been the rise of the 
“policy advisor” position. While employed as a “policy advisor” or another non-lobbyist 
position, it is possible for individuals to escape registration and reporting requirements 
but still make use of their personal contacts (Auble 2013). In addition, even for reported 
lobbying activity, the end beneficiaries are often obscured by client names that are trade 
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organizations or coalitions. There are currently no regulations requiring such groups to 
report their membership, leaving open the possibility that a “coalition” may have only a 
single member and the group is being purposefully used to conceal the name of a client 
that may trigger scrutiny, such as in the case of an audit firm lobbying for an audit client. 
 In order to understand the mechanism by which audit firm lobbying activity can 
serve as a valuable asset in attracting and retaining clients, it is helpful to have a 
framework for understanding the role of lobbyists in general. Prior to the work of 
Bertrand et al. (2013), discussion of lobbying within political science literature focused 
on using an information transfer model to explain lobbying behavior. In the information 
transfer model of lobbying, information is transferred from lobbyists, who serve as 
knowledgeable experts, to legislators and regulators to help inform policy decisions. The 
fact that the regulators at the Securities and Exchange Commission, a frequent target of 
lobbying activity, actively seek out input from experts and stakeholders through the 
Comment Letter process demonstrates the need for such information transfer. 
Under the information transfer model, a lobbyist's value is tied to her ability to 
speak authoritatively and persuasively about the issue. However, as lobbying activity has 
exploded, access becomes more critical. Legislators and regulators have a finite amount 
of time to meet with an increasing number of lobbyists competing for their time. Without 
access, information transfer is not possible, and subject area expertise becomes irrelevant. 
Not only is the concept intuitive, but Bertrand et al. (2013) were also able to validate 
empirically the importance of the relational element of lobbying. I apply their findings to 
auditor lobbying, treating audit firms as extensions of the individual lobbyists they 
employ. Based upon this understanding, the benefit that audit firm lobbying can provide 
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to clients is a function of the audit firms’ long-standing relationships with legislators and 
regulatory bodies, developed over their years of lobbying.  
Auditor Political Activity 
 In the nascent days of the empirical study of auditor lobbying, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1982) examined this relationship via comment letters, focusing on how 
positions endorsed by audit firms either agreed or disagreed with those favored by clients 
as a function of the position’s relative wealth effect for the audit firm. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1982) were among the first to establish empirically that audit firms acted in 
their own economic interests when interacting with rule-setting bodies, upending the 
prevailing conventional wisdom that auditors simply functioned as mouthpieces for their 
clients, as Watts and Zimmerman (1982) put it, “coerced” to take their client’s position 
by their client’s ability to hire or fire the auditor, referencing Sterling (1973). They found 
that the positions audit firms took in their comment letters to the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and its predecessor the Accounting Principles Board were those 
expected to yield positive economic outcomes for auditors through increased voluntary or 
mandated demand for auditor services.  
Work with comment letters, however, had drawbacks in that sample sizes 
were small and the degree of judgment needed to code the content. When new data about 
auditor political activity became available in the form of corporate Political Action 
Committee (PAC) campaign contributions, Thornburg and Roberts (2008) were able to 
find additional support for the argument that audit firms use political activity to further 
their own economic well-being. The shift in focus to PAC contributions also brought with 
it the concept of looking at political activity from the standpoint, taken from political 
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science literature (especially Milyo et al. 2000), of relationship building as opposed to the 
contribution representing support for a particular political position. 
 In a similar fashion, my examination of the lobbying activity of audit 
firms is not focused on the positions taken or the legislative/regulatory outcomes of the 
lobbying but rather the economic consequences of engaging in lobbying activity. 
Regulation of Non-audit Services 
The provision of other services to audit clients has long been a concern to 
regulators.3  The dramatic growth of revenues from the Big 5’s consulting practices in the 
late 1990s brought about “significant changes” to the structure of the firms (SEC 2000), 
prompting the Securities Exchange Commission to revise its auditor independence 
requirements in November 2000. To address economic bonding concerns, the revised 
requirements required filers to disclose all non-audit service fees paid to their auditor. In 
addition, the Commission sought to prevent audit firms from taking on roles incompatible 
with independence by expressly limiting or outright prohibiting auditors from performing 
services for clients in specific areas. A number of the specified areas were minimal 
sources of revenue for the, at the time, Big 5 (such as bookkeeping services), but 
represented audit firms being in the position of auditing their own work. However, 
auditor lobbying, in spite of being a similar conceptual threat to independence and 
minimal source of revenue, managed to escape mention as a prohibited service. 
  
                                                 
3 The 2000 report by the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, which was commissioned by the SEC to assess the 
effects of recent trends in auditing on the quality of audits for publicly traded companies, noted that debate 
over the issue could be traced as far back as the 1950s.  
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Auditor Choice and Differentiation Theory 
 Prior work in the area of auditor switching has only been able to shed 
partial light on the factors that influence a client’s auditor selection decision. Johnson and 
Lys (1990) approached the question by viewing audit firms of similar size as 
undifferentiated and assuming that clients’ primary concern was obtaining the lowest cost 
audit possible. They found that growing clients realigned with larger audit firms 
presumed to have already invested in the specialized assets (disbursed offices, experience 
with voluminous and complex transactions, SEC compliance expertise, etc.) needed to 
deliver the required audit efficiently and cost-effectively. Landsman et al. (2009) in 
examining auditor switches in the post-Enron/SOX era made a similar finding that 
economically mismatched clients realigned with smaller audit firms when the audit 
market was faced with the supply pressure of having to absorb former Andersen clients 
and the increased work required by SOX 404.  Both of these studies, however, were 
limited to providing insight into vertical switching, that is switching up (down) from a 
non-Big N (Big N) to a Big N (non-Big N).  
 However, looking within the Big N market space, Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) 
applied the five forces model in Porter’s (1985) treatise on competitive advantage and 
found that audit firms that successfully differentiated themselves from their competitors 
were able to command a premium for their services. Their measure of differentiation was 
having the highest market share in an industry by ten percent or more than their nearest 
competitor. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
While Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) found that audit firms were able to use 
industry concentration as a successful strategy to make themselves attractive to clients to 
the point of price insensitivity, they did not attempt to propose a mechanism by which an 
audit firm becomes a successfully differentiated industry specialist. Since interest in 
lobbying varies by industry, I propose that lobbying activity is an effective method to 
target and grow business within an industry. Because audit firms repeatedly lobby the 
same politicians and agencies, even when working for different clients or lobbying on 
their own behalf, it is reasonable to consider total lobbying activity in an audit firm’s 
ability to convey “political clout” to potential clients.  
I hypothesize that lobbying activity allows an audit firm to leverage existing 
government relationships which can be expanded or deepened with relatively minimal 
investment to offer potential clients both industry knowledge and access to key 
government officials. The ability to offer this knowledge and access to clients provides an 
audit firm with a competitive advantage over other firms that have comparatively less 
extensive government relationships. As relationships form the source of this competitive 
advantage, it follows that its realization would be relational in nature, namely in the 
ability to retain and attract clients. It also follows that the competitive advantage 
conferred by greater lobbying activity would appeal primarily to clients in industries for 
which lobbying has greater relevance.  
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Consequently, my hypotheses are as follows: 
H1a: Clients in lobbying intensive industries are less likely to switch away 
from audit firms with greater lobbying activity. 
H1b: Clients in lobbying intensive industries retain audit firms with 
greater lobbying activity for longer periods. 
H2: A client’s membership in a lobbying intensive industry is positively 
associated with its choice of an audit firm that lobbies more than its 
previous audit firm. 
In the next chapter, I discuss the empirical models used to test the above 
hypotheses.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test whether audit firms with greater lobbying activity are better able to 
retain clients in lobbying intensive industries, I separately test the effect of relative 
lobbying activity on the probability of an auditor switch (H1a) and on auditor tenure  
(H1b) using the same independent variables. To test H1a, I use the dependent variable 
SWITCH jt, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the client firm switched auditors in the 
current fiscal year or 0 otherwise, to estimate the following logistic regression model:  
SWITCHjt = β0 + β1GROWTHjt-1  + β2ABSDACCjt-1+ β3INVRECjt-1 + β4ROAjt-1 +   
β5LOSSjt-1 + β6LEVERAGEjt-1+ β7CASHjt-1+ β8MODOPjt-1 + β9MERGERjt-
1+ β10SIZEjt-1+ β11LAG_AU_MKT_SHjt-1+ β12(lobbing intensive industry 
indicatorjt)+  β13(auditort lobbing activity measuret-1)+ β14(lobbying 
intensive industry indicatorjt * auditort lobbing activity measuret-1)+ 
β15..27(year fixed effects) +ε                                                                          (1) 
 
To test H1b, I perform an ordinary least squares regression using the dependent 
variable TENUREjt which is defined as the number of years the client has been audited by 
the current year auditor, capped at 10 years. The equation used in the regression is given 
in equation (2) as follows: 
TENUREjt = β0 + β1GROWTHjt-1  + β2ABSDACCjt-1+ β3INVRECjt-1 + β4ROAjt-1 +   
β5LOSSjt-1 + β6LEVERAGEjt-1+ β7CASHjt-1+ β8MODOPjt-1 + β9MERGERjt-
1+ β10SIZEjt-1+ β11LAG_AU_MKT_SHjt-1+ β12(lobbing intensive industry 
indicatorjt)+  β13(auditort lobbing activity measuret-1)+ β14(lobbying 
intensive industry indicatorjt * auditort lobbing activity measuret-1)+ 
β15..27(year fixed effects) +ε                                                                          (2) 
 
 Where the control variables for both equations are defined as 
GROWTH jt-1  = Total assets of client j less beginning total assets, divided by 
beginning total assets for the prior year; 
ABSDACC jt-1 = Absolute value of prior year discretionary total accruals for 
client j; 
INVREC jt-1  = Inventory plus receivables, divided by total assets for the prior 
year for client j; 
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ROA jt-1  = The prior year's return on assets for client j, defined as net income 
before extraordinary items divided by average total assets; 
LOSS jt-1  = Indicator variable equal to 1 if ROA jt-1  is less than zero,  0 
otherwise; 
LEVERAGE jt-1  = The prior year’s ratio of total debt  to total assets for client j; 
CASH jt-1  = Prior year cash divided by total assets for client j; 
MODOP jt-1  = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion for client j in 
the prior year was modified for anything other than a going concern, 0 
otherwise; 
MERGER jt-1  = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client had a merger or 
acquistion in the 2 prior years (any value in Compustat items AQP or AQA), 0 
otherwise; 
SIZEjt-1  = Natural logarithm of the client's prior year market value of equity 
(Compustat CSHO*106*PRCC_F); and 
LAG_AU_MKT_SHjt-1 = the prior year auditor's market share of the client's 
industry in the prior year, calculated as the sum of the square root of assets of 
all firms it audited that year in a given two-digit SIC code divided by the sum 
of the square root of all assets across all Compustat firms in the same two-
digit SIC code, consistent with Hogan and Jeter (1999); 
j denotes client firm; and 
t denotes year (going forward subscripts will be omitted for clarity).                         
 
I use two different specifications to proxy for client interest in lobbying. The 
first is LOBBY_DUM, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company’s SIC code places it 
in one of nine industries within the Fama-French 49 classifications identified by 
Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2013) as an industry with high lobbying activity.4 All 
other companies that do not fall into one of the nine industries are coded as zeros. The 
second measure, LOBBY_DUM2, is also an indicator variable which includes all the 
industries in LOBBY_DUM as well as energy (Non-Metallic and Industrial Mining: 
FF49# 28 and Oil and Natural Gas: FF49# 30), healthcare (Services – health: FF49# 11), 
and financial services (FF49# 48). The additional industries included in LOBBY_DUM2 
                                                 
4 The nine industries are Beer and Liquor (FF49 #4), Tobacco Products (#5), Pharmaceutical 
Products(#13), Aircraft (#24), Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment (#25), Defense (#26),  Precious 
Metals (#27), Coal (#29), and Telephone and Communication Services (#32). 
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reflect professed “practice areas” by Ernst & Young’s lobbying arm, Washington Council 
EY (Washington Council EY).  
Lobbying activity by audit firms is also proxied in two different ways based 
upon each audit firm’s total reported federal lobbying activity in a given year. Total 
reported federal lobbying activity was obtained by summing all amounts reported on the 
federal disclosure forms as recorded by the Center for Responsive Politics where the 
Registrant (the entity performing the lobbying) is a Big N audit firm5. I also include self-
lobbying and lobbying by related entities (as an example, KPMG Consulting is included 
in KPMG’s totals) in order to I aggregate lobbying activity as broadly as possible to 
compensate for underreporting and capture overall political engagement. The total 
reported federal lobbying activity calculated for each audit firm for each year in my 
sample was then used to develop a ranked measure of lobbying activity relative to the 
other audit firms that lobbied that year. LAG_AU_LRANK represents the ranked measure 
of prior year lobbying activity by the client’s auditor of record for the prior year, ranked 
from low to high such that LAG_AU_LRANK equals one for the audit firm with the least 
lobbying activity in a given year be assigned, two for the next highest, etc. Alternatively, 
I also use a binary variable LAG_AU_TOP2 which equals one if the prior year auditor 
was either the top or second-most audit firm in terms of prior year lobbying activity, zero 
otherwise.  
                                                 
5 Lobby activity is measured as the sum of all amounts reported for a given year where the audit firm is 
listed as the Registrant (i.e. the lobbyist). Where the Registrant is also the lobbying client (“self-lobbying”), 
the amount is reported as a lobbying expenditure. When the lobbying client is not the Registrant, the 
amount is reported as lobbying revenue. However, both amounts represent lobbying activity by the 
Registrant, and therefore, my measure of total lobbying activity includes both types of reported amounts. 
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While using variables based upon broadly aggregated lobbying activity 
introduces noise into my measure and relying upon reported lobbying understates 
lobbying activity, these sources of measurement error work against me finding consistent 
and significant associations with lobbying activity in my regressions. 
In testing hypotheses H1a and H1b, I expect to find the coefficient on the 
interaction term (β15) to be negative and significant in equation (1) and positive and 
significant in equation (2). 
To control for other client firm characteristics that influence the auditor-client 
relationship, I follow the lead of Landsman et al. (2009) and select controls that can be 
broadly grouped as proxies for client risk and for economic misalignment.  GROWTH 
represents increased audit risk since rapidly growing firms are not likely to have internal 
control systems that can adequately keep pace with their increased complexity. Similarly, 
per Krishnan (1994), firms where inventory and receivables represent a larger percentage 
of total assets (INVREC) also have higher audit risk. Large discretionary accruals 
(ABSDACC) present either poor audit quality and thus heighted audit risk in the case of 
large income increasing accruals or the possibility of providing an incentive for the client 
to shop for a new, less conservative auditor in the case of large income decreasing 
accruals (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). In the same vein, firms with other than a 
clean opinion (MODOP) represent higher risk or a motivation to shop for a more lenient 
auditor.  ROA, LOSS, LEVERAGE, CASH represent measures of financial risk with 
negative financial indicators (low ROA, LOSS=1, higher LEVERAGE, and less CASH) 
being indicative of a riskier client.   
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The variables SIZE, which is firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of 
the client's prior year market value of equity, and MERGER, an indicator variable if the 
client experienced a merger or acquisition in the two prior years, are also included to 
control for non-lobbying related reasons for switching from or retaining the prior year 
auditor. Additionally, to control for audit firm characteristics that may influence a client’s 
behavior to switch from or continue to retain a particular audit firm, I include the variable 
LAG_AU_MKT_SH, a measure of the audit firm’s market share in the client’s industry 
(LAG_AU_MKT_SH).  
To test H2, I test the association between the choice of an auditor that lobbies 
more than the previous auditor and membership in a lobbying intensive industry. Using a 
sample of auditor changes from 1999-2012 (as determined using changes in the auditor of 
record in the Compustat annual file) from 1999-2012, I estimate the following logistic 
regression model: 
 MORE_LOBBYjt = β0 + β1GROWTHjt-1  + β2ABSDACCjt-1+ β3INVRECjt-1 + β4ROAjt-1 
+   β5LOSSjt-1 + β6LEVERAGEjt-1+ β7CASHjt-1+ β8MODOPjt-1 + 
β9MERGERjt-1+ β10SIZEjt-1+ β11MKT_LEADERjt-1 + β12(lobbing 
intensive industry indicatorjt)+ β13..25(year fixed effects) +ε                                                                                     
      (3) 
 
where 
MORE_LOBBY jt  = Indicator variable equal to 1  if the client switched to an 
audit firm that lobbied more in the prior year (as measured by total reported 
federal lobbying activity) than its previous audit firm did in the same time 
period, 0 otherwise; and  
MKT_LEADERjt-1 = 1 if the client’s current year auditor had the largest 
market share of the client's industry (calculated as described in Hogan and 
Jeter 1999) in the prior year and its market share was at least ten percent 
higher than its closest competitor, 0 otherwise. 
All other variables and notation are as defined for equations (1) and (2), 
likewise subscripts will be omitted for clarity in the remainder of the paper. 
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In this equation, the dependent variable MORE_LOBBY represents the client 
selecting an audit firm that lobbies more than the client’s previous audit firm. It is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the new auditor's total reported federal lobbying activity 
in the prior year exceeded the previous auditor's total reported federal lobbying activity in 
the prior year, zero otherwise. In constructing the model and its dependent variable, I 
acknowledge that intensity of lobbying activity is only one of many reasons why a 
prospective client would choose an audit firm. For this reason, I use an ordinary logistic 
model to test the relative difference in lobbying activity, not whether the client firm 
selects the audit firm with the most lobbying activity in a given year using an ordered 
logit.  Since I include downward switches (Big N to non-Big N) in my sample and 
lobbying activity equals zero dollars for all non-Big N firms, the conversion of relative 
lobbying activity to a binary measure helps to address the skewed distribution of the 
underlying lobbying activity data. Alternatively, in recognition of the fact that two of the 
Big N audit firms dominate auditor lobbying activity and the possibility that clients may 
not be swayed by small differences in lobbying activity, I also specify the dependent 
variable as a binary variable, TOP2_LOBBY, that equals one if the client switched to an 
auditor that was either the top or second-most audit firm in terms of prior year lobbying 
activity, zero otherwise. 
In the same fashion as in equations (1) and (2), I use two different 
specifications (LOBBY_DUM and LOBBY_DUM2) for the binary variable to indicate a 
client’s membership in a lobbying intensive industry. I expect to find the coefficient on 
the indicator variable for the client’s membership in a lobbying intensive industry (β13) to 
be positive and significant. 
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The control variables operate in a similar fashion as in equations (2) and (3); 
however, the market share/market specialization measure in this case (MKT_LEADER) 
is proxied as a binary variable equal to one when the new audit firm had a market share 
ten percentage points or higher than the nearest competitor in the two-digit SIC code of 
the client, i.e. that the audit firm was a clear market leader in the client’s industry. This 
measure was selected as opposed to a continuous measure of market share to reflect the 
results of Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) which found that distinctions between the 
respective market shares of audit firms tended to be insignificant at levels below ten 
percent. 
Year fixed effects are included in all three models to control for the effects of 
Andersen’s collapse, the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley (both initially and the effect 
of the delayed implementation of section 404 for non-accelerated filers), and the financial 
crisis of 2008.
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CHAPTER 5 
DATA 
Sample Selection and Data Used 
As outlined in Table 1, the sample was constructed beginning with all firms in 
Compustat for the years 1999-2012, since lobbying data is only available beginning in 
1998 and my measures of lobbying activity require a one year lag. The data was further 
limited to only firms that switched from one Big N auditor to another Big N auditor 
(Andersen appears in the sample from 1998-2002). Auditor switches from one non-Big 
N firms to another non-Big N firm are excluded from my sample because no non-Big N 
firms report activity as registered lobbyists during the sample period, and therefore, 
switching activity between these non-Big N firms cannot be influenced by auditor 
lobbying activity. After further eliminating firm year observations missing the data need 
to calculate my control variables, I am left with a final sample of 36,719 firm year 
observations for my H1 tests. Further limiting my sample to only those firm-years that 
involved a change in auditor for my test of H2 leaves me with 2,482 observations for 
model (3). All data for control variables was obtained from Compustat, while data 
regarding total annual lobbying activity needed to calculate the variables 
LAG_AU_LRANK and MORE_LOBBY were obtained from publically available data 
gathered from federal disclosure forms by the Center for Responsive Politics.   
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Table 1 
 
Sample Construction 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents a summary of lobbying expenditures by audit firm for all 
years in my sample. Of note in the summary of auditor lobbying activity in Table 2 is the 
clear division in the level of lobbying activity between the two firms of Ernst & Young 
and PriceWaterhouse Coopers and the three other Big N firms in my sample (Arthur 
Andersen, had it existed for the rest of my sample period and maintained the same level 
of activity as it did for the years 1998-2001, would have a profile similar to KPMG). 
Deloitte had the least lobbying activity and took on the fewest outside clients which may 
reflect the possibility that Deloitte’s political activity may be channeled through their 
consulting arm’s specialized group located in Washington D.C.  
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Table 2 
Summary of Lobbying Expenditures 1998-2012 
 
 
Table 3 presents the yearly breakdown of lobbying activity which shows that total 
lobbying activity for all audit firms built up to a peak in 2001, after which 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers relinquished its position as the top auditor lobbyist to Ernst & 
Young, which has maintained that position ever since, albeit at levels comparatively 
subdued from its high of over $8 million in 2003. The lower auditor lobbying activity in 
the later years of my sample is consistent with a general decline in lobbying activity over 
that same time period (Auble 2013).  
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Table 3 
Lobbying Expenditures by Sample Year 
 
 
In examining the top clients of audit firm lobbyists as presented in Table 4, I 
find that audit firms lobbying on their own behalf (self-lobbying) constitutes the single 
largest client for all five of the Big N audit firms. Consistent with their positions as the 
top lobbying audit firms, the vast majority of the top outside clients are split between 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young with two clients switching from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to Ernst & Young around the same time that Ernst & Young 
overtook PriceWaterhouseCoopers as the dominant audit firm in lobbying. The amounts 
reported for outside clients are much smaller than for self-lobbying and represent a small 
portion the total lobbying activity by auditing firms when compared to the amounts 
reported in Table 2. Another item of note is that a number of the clients are coalitions or 
alliances that represent multiple firms. Many of the names of these multi-firm groups 
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imply that the purpose of these groups is to lobby on tax issues (e.g. Ernst & Young’s 
R&D Credit Coalition and PwC’s Leasing Coalition).  
Table 4 
Top 25 Clients of Audit Firm Lobbyists  
(Includes Self-Lobbying) 
 
 
Looking at gains in audit clients in lobbying intensive industries in Table 5, 
consistent with their position as the two audit firms with the most lobbying activity, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young gained the most clients in lobbying 
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intensive industries. Ernst & Young was the most successful in gaining these clients 
following the dissolution of Arthur Andersen. 
Table 5 
Audit Client Gains in Lobbying Intensive Industries by Year 
 
 
Table 6 reports the results of a univariate analysis of the mean difference in 
lobbying activity for the year prior to an auditor switch between the new and old audit 
firms. I find that on average, firms in lobbying intensive industries switch to an auditor 
with approximately $909,622 more in lobbying activity than their previous auditor. This 
mean value is significantly different from zero; its positive value illustrates the tendency 
for firms in lobbying intensive industries to move to an auditor with greater lobbying 
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activity than their previous auditor.  The difference between the means for clients in 
lobbying intensive industries and those not in lobbying intensive industries is also 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.0732), a finding consistent with auditor lobbying 
activity being more relevant for firms in lobbying intensive industries. 
 
Table 6 
Univariate Analysis of Lobbying Expenditures 
(N=2,482) 
 
 
 Tables 7 and 8 present descriptive statistics for the variables in the multivariate 
models. Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of equations (1) and 
(2).  
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Table 7 
SWITCH / TENURE Models Descriptive Statistics  
(N=36,719) 
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Table 8 
MORE_LOBBY / TOP2_LOBBY Model Descriptive Statistics  
(N=2,482) 
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In Table 7, I find that the mean values for my dependent variables of 6.3% for 
SWITCH and 5.992 years for TENURE are consistent with prior archival work in that 
relatively few clients switch auditors. When looking at the sample restricted to only those 
client firms that experienced an auditor switch in Table 8, I find in the mean value of 
MORE_LOBBY that over 40% of firms in my sample switch to an auditor that lobbies 
more than their previous auditor.  
Comparing Tables 7 and 8, I find that lobbying intensive firms, as defined by 
LOBBY_DUM, make up a relatively small portion of both samples, 15% and 7.3% 
respectively. When I expand the definition of lobbying intensive firms in 
LOBBY_DUM2, I find that these firms make up 21.7% of the sample as reported in Table 
7 and 24% in Table 8. Contrasting the two samples, I find that clients experiencing an 
auditor switch tend to be smaller (mean values of SIZE representing a mean market 
capitalization of $222 million in Table 8 vs. $404 million in Table 7). 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
Tables 9 through 11 present the results of my hypothesis testing. In Table 9 I 
present the results of my testing of H1a, the likelihood that a client in a lobbying 
intensive industry will switch away from an audit firm with greater lobbying activity. I 
find that the coefficient on the interaction of the audit firm’s lobbying activity and the 
client’s membership in a lobbying intensive industry is negative and significant no matter 
which specification I use of audit firm lobbying activity or client membership in a 
lobbying intensive industry. This finding is consistent with a lowered probability of a 
switch away from an audit firm with increasing lobbying activity on the part of the audit 
firm when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying activity. I also find 
that, moving from column (1) to column (4), the value for McFadden’s pseudo R-squared 
increases when I utilize my alternate specifications with the model using both alternative 
specifications LOBBY_DUM2 and LAG_AU_TOP2 in column (4) having the highest 
value of 0.1046. When comparing the values to the McFadden’s pseudo R-squared value 
for the model when run without including lobbying activity (0.093 in untabulated results), 
I find that lobbying activity contributes to the explanatory power of the SWITCH model.  
Table 10 presents the results of my testing of H1b on the relationship between 
an audit firm’s lobbying activity and the ability to retain clients in lobbying intensive 
industries. I find that the interaction term is positive and significant no matter which 
specification I use for audit firm lobbying activity or client membership in a lobbying 
intensive industry, consistent with increased lobbying activity being associated with 
longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying.   
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Table 9 
Logistic Regression: Dependent Variable – SWITCH 
(N=36,719) 
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Table 10 
OLS Regression: Dependent Variable – TENURE 
(N=36,719)
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While I do not find that the value of the adjusted R-squared increases when moving from 
column (1) to column (4) in the TENURE model results in Table 10, I do find that using 
LOBBY_DUM2 does add incremental explanatory value over models using 
LOBBY_DUM. Additionally, the adjusted R-squared for column (1) when the 
LAG_AU_LRANK variable is excluded is 0.0882 (untabulated), indicating that the 
inclusion of lobbying activity does increase the explanatory power of the auditor tenure 
model. 
To test H2, the likelihood that a client in a lobbying intensive industry will 
move to an audit firm that lobbies more than its previous audit firm, I restrict my sample 
to only those firms experiencing an auditor switch involving a Big N auditor. The results 
of testing H2 are presented in Table 11, where the dependent variable MORE_LOBBY 
represents whether the client firm’s new auditor had higher lobbying activity than their 
previous auditor and TOP2_LOBBY represent whether the client firm’s new auditor was 
one of the top two audit firms in terms of lobbying activity in the previous year. 
I find that a client firm’s interest in lobbying (as proxied by its membership in 
a lobbying intensive industry using LOBBY_DUM or LOBBY_DUM2) is positive and 
significant or marginally significant across the various model specifications. However, in 
contrast to my findings for H1a and H1b, I find that the alternative specifications for 
auditor lobbying activity (MORE_LOBBY vs. TOP2_LOBBY) and client membership in a 
lobbying intensive industry (LOBBY_DUM vs. LOBBY_DUM2) weaken the relationship 
and reduce the value of McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. In spite of this fact, I still find 
that the LOBBY_DUM variable is positive and significant when using either 
MORE_LOBBY or TOP2_LOBBY as the dependent variable, indicating that  
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Table 11 
H2 Tests: Logistic Regressions  
(N=2,482) 
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firms in lobbying intensive industries are more likely to choose an auditor that lobbies 
more than their previous auditor.  
Although the focus of this paper is on the economic benefits for audit firms 
engaging in lobbying activity, one of the limitations of my study is that it is not possible 
to calculate an objective return on investment on lobbying activity. Since I focus on the 
competitive advantage gained from federal lobbying, I examine lobbying activity on the 
part of audit firms on a relative basis. Thus, it is not possible to calculate the economic 
yield to a firm in terms of audit fees gained or retained of additional monetary units of 
lobbying activity. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
By examining the relationship between relative lobbying activity and auditor 
switching behavior, I seek to understand whether audit firms achieve economic benefits 
that justify the perceived threats to independence brought about lobbying activities. In 
examining the decision to switch auditors as well the length of auditor tenure, I find that 
greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching and 
longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I 
also find that, for clients that are switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms 
with greater lobbying activity. Even after controlling for other factors in the choice of 
audit firm, I find that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more 
likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor. 
My results also suggest that greater lobbying activity by an audit firm is associated with 
better quality new clients in that they are lower risk. 
In examining federal lobbying activity by audit firms and its benefits, I 
provide additional insight into both strategic competitive behaviors by Big N audit firms 
and client behavior in audit firm selection. However, the competitive advantage an audit 
firm can gain through federal lobbying is tempered by regulatory concerns.  
Advocacy on behalf of a client is included as a threat to independence in the 
profession’s own AICPA Conceptual Framework for Independence Standards, where 
advocacy is defined as “actions that promote an attest client’s interest or position.” The 
same Conceptual Framework also enumerates that professional independence includes 
independence “in appearance” as well as “in fact.” No less a “reasonable and informed 
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third party” than the Securities Exchange Commission has brought up lobbying 
relationships in the context of other non-audit services that could be perceived to impair 
independence. While those other non-audit services were eventually expressly banned, 
lobbying remained in an ambiguous state. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
auditor lobbying is a threat to independence, if not in fact, at least in appearance, and 
empirically it can be seen that very few audit clients report engaging their audit firm to 
lobby on their behalf6. It is very likely that the scrutiny that the auditing profession 
received and continues to receive in the wake of the large accounting scandals that 
prompted the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) serves as a constraint in 
limiting their lobbying for outside clients and thus the amount to which federal lobbying 
activity can be used as a competitive strategy.  
  
                                                 
6 In their sample which covered the period 1998-2008, Burnett et al. (2013) only found 16 firms (41 firm-
years) that used their own auditor as a lobbyist. 
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APPENDIX A  
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
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Dependent Variables 
SWITCH 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1  if the client firm switched auditors 
in the current fiscal year, 0 otherwise 
TENURE 
 
Number of years audited by the current year auditor, capped at 
10 years 
MORE_LOBBY 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client switched to an auditor 
that lobbied more in the prior year (as measured by total reported 
Federal lobbying activity) than its predecessor auditor in the 
same time period, 0 otherwise 
TOP2_LOBBY 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client switched to an auditor 
that was either the top or second-most audit firm in terms of prior 
year lobbying activity, 0 otherwise    
Independent Variables 
LOBBY_DUM 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1  if the client firm is classified in an 
industry with high lobbying activity (FF49 #'s 4, 5, 13, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 29, 32), 0 otherwise 
LOBBY_DUM2 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client firm is classified any of 
the industries included in LOBBY_DUM or in any of an 
additional 5 industries (FF49 #'s 28, 30, 11, 48), 0 otherwise 
LAG_AU_LRANK The prior year auditor's rank order from low to high of prior year 
lobbying activity (measured in dollars), i.e. the audit firm with 
the least lobbying activity in a given year will be assigned 1, the 
next highest 2, etc.  
LAG_AU_TOP2 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1if the prior year auditor was either 
the top or second-most audit firm in terms of prior year lobbying 
activity, 0 otherwise    
Control Variables 
LAG_AU_MKT_SH The prior year auditor's market share of the client's industry in 
the prior year, calculated as the sum of the square root of assets 
of all firms it audited that year in a given two-digit SIC code 
divided by the sum of the square root of all assets across all 
Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code, consistent with 
Hogan and Jeter (1999) and Mayhew and Wilkins (2003) 
MKT_LEADER 
 
1 if current year auditor had the largest market share of the client's 
industry (calculated as described below) in the prior year and its 
market share was at least ten percent higher than its closest 
competitor, 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH   
 
Prior year percent growth in assets calculated as total assets 
(Compustat field AT) less beginning total assets, divided by 
beginning total assets 
ABSDACC   
 
Absolute value of prior year total discretionary accruals 
INVREC   
 
Inventory (Compustat field INVT) plus receivables (Compustat 
field RECT), divided by total assets for the prior year 
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ROA   
 
The prior year's return on assets, defined as net income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat field IB) divided by average total 
assets 
LOSS   
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if ROA_tm1 is less than zero,  0 
otherwise 
LEVERAGE   
 
Ratio of debt  (Compustat items DLTT+DLC ) to total assets for 
the prior year 
CASH   
 
Prior year cash (Compustat item CHE) scaled by prior year total 
assets 
MODOP   
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion in the prior year 
was modified for anything other than a going concern (value for 
Compustat item AUOP anything other than 1), 0 otherwise 
(AUOP=1). 
MERGER    Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client had a merger or 
acquisition in the prior 2 years (any value in Compustat items 
AQP or AQA), 0 otherwise 
SIZE   
 
Natural logarithm of the client's prior year market value of equity 
(Compustat CSHO*106*PRCC_F) 
   
   
 
